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Abstract
While neural networks have achieved high perfor-
mance in different learning tasks, their accuracy
drops significantly in the presence of small adver-
sarial perturbations to inputs. Defenses based on
regularization and adversarial training are often
followed by new attacks to defeat them. In this
paper, we propose attack-agnostic robustness cer-
tificates for a multi-label classification problem
using a deep ReLU network. Although comput-
ing the exact distance of a given input sample
to the classification decision boundary requires
solving a non-convex optimization, we character-
ize two lower bounds for such distances, namely
the simplex certificate and the decision boundary
certificate. These robustness certificates leverage
the piece-wise linear structure of ReLU networks
and use the fact that in a polyhedron around a
given sample, the prediction function is linear. In
particular, the proposed simplex certificate has
a closed-form, is differentiable and is an order
of magnitude faster to compute than the exist-
ing methods even for deep networks. In addition
to theoretical bounds, we provide numerical re-
sults for our certificates over MNIST and compare
them with some existing upper bounds.
1. Introduction
Although neural network models have achieved state-of-
the-art results on several learning tasks, in the last couple
of years, researchers have demonstrated their lack of ro-
bustness with respect to adversarial perturbations. For ex-
ample, in image classification, adversarial examples have
been crafted to mislead the classifier while being visually
indistinguishable from normal examples (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Szegedy et al., 2013; Shafahi et al., 2018).
In the last couple of years, a pattern has been emerged that
defense mechanisms against existing attacks are often fol-
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lowed by stronger attacks to break them. Even detecting the
presence of adversarial examples in a dataset seems to be
difficult (Hendrik Metzen et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner,
2017). Moreover, different references have shown that ad-
versarial examples can exist in the physical world as well
(Sharif et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016a; Eykholt et al.,
2017). This can be a significant issue in deploying neural
networks in applications such as self-driving cars, authenti-
cation systems, malware detection etc.
Studying adversarial examples for neural networks has
twofold purposes: (i) devising stronger attack algorithms
for crafting adversarial examples that can break the existing
defense mechanisms, and (ii) developing defenses and evalu-
ating their robustness to adversarial perturbations. In theory,
the evaluation of a neural networks robustness should be ag-
nostic to the attack methods. However, existing methods use
the distortions obtained by different attacks as an empirical
robustness measure of a target neural network. As high-
lighted by (Goodfellow, 2018), attack based methodology
provides merely an upper bound on the size of perturbation
needed to fool the prediction model while security guaran-
tees require a lower bound on the size of the adversarial
perturbation.
The robustness evaluation based on such attack approaches
can cause biases in the analysis. For example, adversarial
training retrains the network by adding crafted adversarial
examples using some attack methods to the training set.
Although a network trained using adversarial training can
be robust to the attack used to craft the adversarial examples,
it can be susceptible to other types of attacks (Athalye et al.,
2018; Athalye & Sutskever, 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2016).
In this work, we propose attack-agnostic certificates of ro-
bustness for a multi-label classification problem using a
deep ReLU network. Our certificates leverage the piece-
wise linear structure of deep ReLU networks and use the
fact that the prediction function is linear in a polyhedron
around a given sample. The key advantage of our certificate
compared to other existing lower bounds (e.g. (Zhang et al.,
2018; Weng et al., 2018a)) is its extremely efficient compu-
tation even for very deep networks. Below we explain the
key ideas of our proposed certificates.
For a ReLU network, we define an activation pattern θ that
represents whether or not each neuron is active (on or off) in
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(a) Closest adversarial example lies inside the linear region (b) Closest adversarial example lies outside the linear region
Figure 1. In our robustness certificates, we exploit the piecewise linear structure of ReLU networks, i.e. the prediction function is linear
in some convex region (polyhedron) around an input point. The closest adversarial example, then, either lies inside or outside of this
region. In case (a), we use the linear function to get the certificate while in case (b), we use the boundaries of the linear region to obtain a
robustness certificate. In both cases, the radius of the green dotted circle gives the proposed Simplex certificate.
the network. We show that for a given activation pattern θ,
the region in which all inputs induce that pattern on network
ReLUs forms a polyhedron. We refer to this convex region
by S(θ) and show that for x ∈ S(θ), the neural network is
a linear function dθ(.) where dθ(x) = W(θ)x + b(θ). In
Section 3, we explain how to efficiently compute S(θ) and
dθ(.) for a deep ReLU network. For a class k, we say that
dθ(x) =W
(θ)x+ b(θ) defines K − 1 decision boundaries
where K is the total number of classes. That is,
(W
(θ)
j −W(θ)k )x+ b(θ)j − b(θ)k = 0
is a decision boundary for all j 6= k. W(θ)j is the jth row of
W(θ) and b(θ)j is the scalar in the j
th position of b(θ).
For example, consider a two-layer neural network for the
binary classification task where the input dimension is D =
2 and the number of neurons in the hidden layer is N1 = 3.
In this case, the activation pattern θ is a binary vector of
length three (θ ∈ {0, 1}3.) Figure 1 represents an example
polyhedron defined by θ (in this case, the polyhedron is a
triangle since we have three affine constraints).
Exploiting this geometric structure of the ReLU network,
we characterize two lower bounds for the distance of a given
input to the closest adversarial example:
• The Simplex Certificate: This certificate applies to
a ReLU network with any arbitrary depth and for a
multi-label classification problem. For a given input u
(and therefore an activation pattern θ and a predicted
class k), let S(θ) = {x : P(θ)x + q(θ) ≥ 0} and
dθ(x) =W
(θ)x+ b(θ).
We consider two cases: The first case is when the
closest adversarial example lies inside S(θ) (e.g. see
Figure 1a). In this case, the lower bound to the closest
adversarial example is given by the minimum distance
of u to all K − 1 decision boundaries defined by dθ(.):
min
j 6=k
| (W(θ)j −W(θ)k )u+ (b(θ)j − b(θ)k ) |
‖(W(θ)j −W(θ)k )‖2
In this case, the exact distance can be obtained by solv-
ing a linear program for every j 6= k. However, the
above closed-form formula provides a lower bound
which is very efficient to compute even for deep net-
works.
The second case is where the closest adversarial exam-
ple does not lie inside S(θ) (e.g. see Figure 1b). In this
case, a lower bound to the closest adversarial example
can be characterized as the distance of the point to the
closest face of the polyhedron S(θ) as follows:
min
i
| P(θ)i u+ q(θ)i |
‖P(θ)i ‖2
.
The minimum of these two quantities act as our Simplex
certificate. We present details of this certificate in
Section 4.1.
• The Decision Boundary Certificate: Unlike the sim-
plex certificate which can be used for a ReLU network
for an arbitrary depth, this certificate applies to a two-
layer ReLU network.
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For a given input u with a predicted class k, we can
write the certificate in terms of the minimum distance
to all possible decision boundaries as follows:
min
j 6=k
min
θ(1)∈{0,1}N1
| (W(θ)j −W(θ)k )u+ b(θ)j − b(θ)k |
‖W(θ)j −W(θ)k ‖2
(1)
where θ(1) denotes the indicator vector for the activa-
tions of the first hidden layer and N1 is the number of
hidden units in the first hidden layer.
We show that ‖W(θ)j − W(θ)k ‖2 ≤ ‖(W(2)j −
W
(2)
k )‖2‖W(1)‖2 and relax θ(1) ∈ {0, 1}N1 to θ(1) ∈
[0, 1]N1 . This leads to the following lower bound:
min
j 6=k
min
θ(1)∈[0,1]N1
| (W(θ)j −W(θ)k )u+ b(θ)j − b(θ)k |
‖(W(2)j −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
.
For a two-layer network, we show that the numera-
tor is linear in θ(1). Thus, the above optimization can
be solved using convex optimization. For deeper net-
works, the numerator term can be a higher-order poly-
nomial in θ making the optimization difficult to solve.
Thus, for the decision boundary certificate, we only
focus on two-layer neural networks. We discuss details
of this certificate in Section 4.2.
In what follows, we explain details of these results. All
proofs have been presented in Appendix.
2. Background and related work
The adversarial attacks and defenses have received signif-
icant attention from the machine learning community in
the last couple of years (Szegedy et al., 2013; Uesato et al.,
2018; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Athalye et al., 2018; Athalye
& Sutskever, 2017; Buckman et al., 2018; Kurakin et al.,
2016b; Papernot et al., 2016; Zantedeschi et al., 2017; Pa-
pernot et al., 2016; Trame`r et al., 2017; Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2016a; 2017; Kannan et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2017;
Eykholt et al., 2017). A wide range of defenses have been
proposed to harden neural networks against adversarial at-
tacks. However, a pattern has emerged in which the majority
of adversarial defenses are broken by new attacks. For ex-
ample,(Carlini & Wagner, 2016), (Athalye et al., 2018),
(Athalye & Sutskever, 2017), (Uesato et al., 2018) broke
several of these proposed defenses.
2.1. Creating Adversarial Examples
The current state-of-the-art white-box attack methods are the
iterative fast gradient sign method (I-FGSM) (Goodfellow
et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016b), DeepFool (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016), Carlini and Wagners attack (CW
attack) (Carlini & Wagner, 2016), elastic-net attacks to deep
neural networks (Chen et al., 2017a), robust physical pertur-
bations attack (Eykholt et al., 2017), EOT attack (Athalye
et al., 2017). In the white-box attacks, the network param-
eters are assumed to be visible to the attacker. Black-box
adversarial attacks are also possible by computing universal
adversarial perturbations (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016),
using ensemble approaches (Liu et al., 2017), using substi-
tute models (Papernot et al., 2016; Ilyas et al., 2018a), em-
ploying zero-order optimization-based attacks (Chen et al.,
2017b; Ilyas et al., 2018b).
2.2. Certifiable Defenses
A number of “certifiable” defense mechanisms have been
developed for certain classifiers. (Raghunathan et al., 2018)
harden a two-layer classifier using semidefinite program-
ming, and (Sinha et al., 2018) proposes a convex duality-
based approach to adversarial training that works on suf-
ficiently small adversarial perturbations with a quadratic
adversarial loss, while (Kolter & Wong, 2017) considers
training a robust classifier using the convex outer adver-
sarial polytope. (Gowal et al., 2018) shows how applying
interval bound propagation during training, combined with
MILP-based exact verification, can lead to provably robust
networks. These provable defenses, although very insightful,
are either restrictive or are computationally expensive.
2.3. Theoretical Robustness Guarantees against
Adversarial Examples
In recent years, formal verification methods were developed
to verify robustness of neural networks. Most of these meth-
ods use satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers (Ehlers,
2017; Katz et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2016b) or Large
scale Mixed integer Linear Programming (MILP) solvers
(Cheng et al., 2017; Lomuscio & Maganti, 2017; Tjeng
et al., 2017). However, these methods scale poorly with the
number of ReLUs in a network, making them prohibitively
slow in practice even for medium-sized models. (Katz et al.,
2017) has illustrated the difficulty of exact verification by
proving that it is NP-complete.
Some methods computes robustness certificates by comput-
ing the Lipschitz constants. For example, (Szegedy et al.,
2013) evaluates the Lipschitz constant for each layer of the
network and uses the product of these Lipschitz constants to
demonstrate the robustness issue in neural networks. Refer-
ence (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017) derives a closed-form
robustness certificate using a local Lipschitz continuous
condition for a single-hidden layer feed-forward network.
However, a closed-form lower bound for an arbitrary depth
multi-layer-perceptron (similar to our simplex certificate)
seems to be difficult to compute. (Weng et al., 2018b) com-
putes a characterization of the lower bound for distances to
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the closest adversarial examples. However, as highlighted
by (Goodfellow, 2018), their proposed method computes an
empirical estimate of this theoretical lower bound and hence
is not a robustness certificate in general. (Zhang et al., 2018;
Weng et al., 2018a) compute a theoretical lower bound but
it can be expensive to compute for large networks.
An upper bound to the distance of a point to its closest ad-
versarial example can be computed using a certain attack
(Bastani et al., 2016). This differs from our proposed robust-
ness certificates because our certificate is a lower bound on
the minimum distortion and is attack agnostic. Additionally,
our simplex certificate is differentiable and can be computed
in closed form for a given input for any deep multi-layer
perceptron with ReLU activations. We show that simplex
certificate is an order of magnitude faster to compute than
the state of the art methods (Zhang et al., 2018; Weng et al.,
2018a).
3. Piecewise Linear Structures of ReLU
Networks
In this section, we provide notation and definitions that
will be used in characterizing our robustness certificates.
To simplify the exposition, the approaches are developed
under the notation of fully connected networks with ReLU
activations for a multi-label classification problem.
3.1. Notation
We consider a neural network withM layers andNi neurons
in the ith layer (M ≥ 2 and i ∈ [M ]) for a multi-class
classification problem. Let N be the total number of hidden
neurons in the network. The number of classes is equal to
K (or NM ). The corresponding function of neural network
is f : RD → RK where D is the dimension of the input.
We use x to represent an input instance in RD. We use
[L] to denote the set {1, . . . , L}. For an input x, we use
z(i)(x) ∈ RNi and a(i)(x) ∈ RNi to denote the input
(before applying ReLU activations) and output (after apply-
ing ReLU activations) of neurons in the i-th hidden layer
of the network, respectively. For simplicity, we refer to
z(i)(x) and a(i)(x) as raw and activated neurons in the i-th
layer, respectively. The raw and activated neurons in the
j-th position of the i-th hidden layer are given by z(i)j (x)
and a(i)j (x) respectively. To simplify notation and when no
confusion arises, we make the dependency of z(i) and a(i)
to x implicit. We define a(0)(x) = x and N0 = D.
With a fully connected architecture and ReLU activations,
each z(i) and a(i) (for i ∈ [M ]) is computed using a trans-
formation matrix W(i) ∈ RNi×Ni−1 and the bias vector
b(i) ∈ RNi as follows:
z(i)(x) =W(i)a(i−1)(x) + b(i)
a(i)(x) = ReLU
(
z(i)(x)
)
= max
(
0, z(i)(x)
)
a(M)(x) = z(M)(x).
The weight and bias vectors for the j-th row of W(i) and
b(i) are given by W(i)j and b
(i)
j , respectively. For a given
input x, the vector of logits is given by,
f(x) = z(M)(x).
We use fi(x) to denote the logit for the class i where i ∈
[K]. The predicted class is given by
yˆ(x) = argmax
i∈[K]
fi(x).
We use  to denote the Hadamard Product. We use Ai to
denote the ith row of the matrix A. For a vector v, we use
vi to denote the element in the ith position of the vector.
We use diag(v) to denote the diagonal matrix formed by
placing each element of v along the diagonal.
Definition 1 (Activation pattern). An activation pattern θ
is a set of indicator vectors for each hidden layer of the
network. The indicator vector for ith hidden layer (i ∈
[M − 1]) is denoted by θ(i) and specifies the following
functional constraints:
θ
(i)
j =
{
1, z
(i)
j (x) ≥ 0
0, z
(i)
j (x) < 0
We denote θ as θ = {θ(1), . . . , θ(M−1)}.
We say that an input x induces an activation pattern θ in
f if the activation pattern defined by the neurons zij(x) is
equal to θ. Informally, an activation pattern θ represents a
configuration of all ReLUs in the network as either being
”on” or ”off”.
Definition 2 (Activation Region). For a given activation
pattern θ, we define the activation region S(θ) such that:
x induces θ in f ⇐⇒ x ∈ S(θ)
Thus the activation region for an activation pattern θ, is the
largest region such that all inputs in the region induce the
activation pattern θ.
Definition 3 (Decision function). For a given activation
pattern θ, we define the decision function dθ : Rd → RK
such that for every x that induces the activation pattern θ:
dθ(x) = f(x), ∀ x ∈ S(θ).
The decision function is the function such that for all inputs
that induce a certain activation pattern, the neural network
and the decision function are the same.
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3.2. Polyhedral Structures of ReLU Networks
Because ReLU networks are piece-wise linear functions,
they are linear in some region around a given input. In this
section, we prove that for an arbitrarily deep ReLU network,
the activation region for an activation pattern is a convex
polyhedron and in this region, the neural network is linear.
Furthermore, we derive the exact polyhedron in which the
activation pattern is constant.
We first explain our results for a two-layer neural network
and then present our them for a neural network with an
arbitrary depth. For a two-layer ReLU networks, the activa-
tion pattern θ is merely composed of one vector θ(1) (since
M = 2 in this case). In this case, we have:
Theorem 1. Given an activation pattern θ = {θ(1)} for a
two-layer network, we have:
(a) The activation region is S(θ) where
S(θ) = ∩i=N1i=1 S(1)i (θ) ,
S1i (θ) =
{
x :W
(1)
i x+ b
(1)
i ≥ 0 if θ(1)i = 1
x :W
(1)
i x+ b
(1)
i < 0 if θ
(1)
i = 0
(b) The decision function is dθ(.) where
dθ(x) =W
(θ)x+ b(θ),
W(θ) =W(2)diag(θ(1))W(1) ,
b(θ) =W(2)diag(θ(1))b(1) + b(2)
Note that in this case S(θ) is a polyhedron characterized
using N1 linear constraints (i.e. N1 faces). At a vertex,
D linearly independent constraints are tight (i.e. equal to
zero). In total,
(
N1
D
)
combinations are possible. But all the(
N1
D
)
combinations may not have D linearly independent
equations and some of them may not have satisfy the other
inequality constraints of the polyhedron.
A similar result can be stated for a ReLU network with an
arbitrary depth (although the notation is a bit more complex
than that of the two-layer case).
We present this result in the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Consider an M layer (M ≥ 3) neural net-
work (denoted by f(.)) and an activation pattern θ =
{θ(1), . . . , θ(M−1)}. Consider the M − 1 layer neural net-
work (denoted by g(.)) constructed by removing the last
weight layer and the last activation layer such that
g(x) = z(M−1)(x) ∀ x ∈ RD
and the activation pattern φ = {θ(1), . . . , θ(M−2)}. Given
the decision function dφ(x) = W(φ)x + b(φ) and the ac-
tivation region T (φ) for g(.), (a) the activation region for
f(.) is S(θ) where:
S(θ) = T (φ) ∩ S(M−1)(θ) where,
S(M−1)(θ) = ∩i=NM−1i=1 S(M−1)i (θ) and
S
(M−1)
i (θ) =
{
x :W
(φ)
i x+ b
(φ)
i ≥ 0 if θ(M−1)i = 1
x :W
(φ)
i x+ b
(φ)
i < 0 if θ
(M−1)
i = 0
and (b) the decision function for f(.) is dθ(.) where:
dθ(x) =W
(θ)x+ b(θ) where,
W(θ) =W(M)diag(θ(M−1))W(φ) and
b(θ) =W(M)diag(θ(M−1))b(φ) + b(M)
As a consequence of Theorem 2, the decision function at a
layer is a function of the weights and biases of all layers upto
(and including) the current layer, the activation region can be
constructed using the decision function at the previous layer
and the indicator vector of the current layer. Moreover, the
number of linear constraints needed to define the activation
region S(θ) for a deep ReLU network grows linearly with
respect to the depth of the network:
Corollary 1. For an M layer network and activation pattern
θ, the activation region is a polyhedron with
∑i=M−1
i=1 Ni
inequalities and the decision function is linear in the input.
Thus, the activation region S(θ) is a polyhedron and can be
represented in terms of linear inequalities.
S(θ) = {x : P(θ)x+ q(θ) ≥ 0}
where P(θ) and q(θ) are constant given θ, P(θ) is a matrix
of dimensions (
∑M−1
i=1 Ni) × D and q(θ) is a vector of
dimension (
∑M−1
i=1 Ni).
We emphasize that the activation region may not be the
largest linear region around the input point. Indeed the
linear region could be larger than the activation region if the
linear function remains the same in some adjoining region
with a different activation pattern. However, the activation
region is provably the largest region in which the activation
pattern is the same.
Since the decision function is locally linear in x, at the ith
layer (with the decision function dθ(x) =W(θ)x+ b(θ) =
z(i)(x)), we can compute the jth row W(θ)j using the gra-
dient of z(i)j with respect to the input, i.e., ∇xz(i)j , in any
autograd software. However, current autograd implementa-
tions do not support the gradient of a vector with respect to
the neuron’s input, i.e. ∇xz(i). Thus, to compute W(θ), we
need to call ∇xz(i)j once for each row of W(θ) (Ni times
total) making the gradient based implementation expensive.
To circumvent these issues, we propose an efficient itera-
tive method to compute the activation region and decision
function for a multi-layer-perceptron in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1
Computing Activation Region and Decision Function
Input:
Input point: x
Network weights: {W(i),b(i) ∀ i ∈ {M}}
Initialize:
a(0) ← x, C←W(1), d← b(1), P← ∅, q← ∅
for i = 1 to M − 1 do
z(i) ←W(i)a(i−1) + b(i)
θ(i) ← z(i) ≥ 0
a(i) ← z(i)  θ(i)
P(i) ← diag(2θ(i) − 1)C
q(i) ← diag(2θ(i) − 1)d
P← concat(P, P(i), axis=0)
q← concat(q, q(i), axis=0)
C←W(i+1)diag(θ(i))C
d←W(i+1)diag(θ(i))d+ b(i+1)
end for
return (P,q), (C,d)
Algorithm 1 computes the activation region S(θ) and the
decision function dθ(.) efficiently for the activation pattern
θ induced by an input x so that we can write them in terms
of the returned matrices (P,q), (C,d):
dθ(x) = Cx+ d
S(θ) = {x : Px+ q ≥ 0}
Multiplication by diag(2θ(i)−1) flips the sign of the rowCj
if θ(i)j is zero and keeps the same sign otherwise. Similarly,
multiplication by diag(θ(i)) zeros out the row Cj if θ
(i)
j is
zero and keeps the same row otherwise. Thus Algorithm 1
can compute S(θ) and dθ(.) efficiently in one forward pass.
4. Robustness Certificates for ReLU Networks
In this section, we present our robustness certificates (lower
bounds of the distance between a point to the closest adver-
sarial examples) for ReLU networks. The closest adversarial
example to a given point x is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Closest adversarial example). For a given
input u with predicted class k, we define the closest ad-
versarial example u0 such that: (a) its assigned label is
different than k, i.e.
fk(u0) = fj(u0) ≥ fi(u0) j 6= k, ∀ i ∈ [K] (2)
(b) its distance is minimum to x compared to all vectors v
satisfying 2, i.e.
‖u− u0‖2 ≤ ‖u− v‖2
4.1. The Simplex Certificate
In this section we derive a differentiable certificate against
adversarial examples that can be computed for any arbitrar-
ily deep multi-layer-perceptron. We have illustrated the key
intuition behind this certificate which we refer to it as the
simplex certificate in Figure 1. If the nearest adversarial ex-
ample lies inside the polyhedron S(θ), we know the linear
function characterizing the decision boundary and we can
compute a lower bound on the distance to the closest adver-
sarial example (Panel (a) in Figure 1). On the other hand, if
the closest adversarial example lies outside the polyhedron
S(θ), we can compute a lower bound using the minimum
distance of the point x to the boundaries of the Polyhedron
S(θ) (Panel (b) in Figure 1). This procedure leads to the
following theorem:
Theorem 3. Given a test input u with predicted class k and
the activation pattern θ it induces, let dθ(x) = W(θ)x +
b(θ) be the decision function and let S(θ) = {x : P(θ)x+
q(θ) ≥ 0} be the activation region. We define:
Pmin = min
i
| P(θ)i u+ q(θ)i |
‖P(θ)i ‖2
dmin = min
j 6=k
| (W(θ)j −W(θ)k )u+ (b(θ)j − b(θ)k ) |
‖(W(θ)j −W(θ)k )‖2
Let u0 be the closest adversarial example. We have that:
‖u− u0‖2 ≥ min(dmin, Pmin)
Hence, min(dmin, Pmin) defines a provable lower bound
to the closest adversarial example.
Note that N1 rows of P(θ) and q(θ) are a function of the
weights and biases of the first layer, N2 rows of P(θ) and
q(θ) are a function of the weights and biases of both the
first and the second layers and so on. Since both dmin and
Pmin are differentiable and can be computed in a single for-
ward pass using Algorithm 1, we can use this certificate for
training robust classifiers as well. In this work, however, we
focus on just characterizing this quantity as a certificate for
robustness for an arbitrarily deep pre-trained ReLU network.
Training robust classifiers using a regularization based on
the proposed simplex certificate can be an interesting direc-
tion for the future work.
4.2. The Decision Boundary Certificate
In this section, we derive another lower bound to the closest
adversarial example. Unlike the simplex lower bound which
can be used for a ReLU network for an arbitrary depth, this
lower bound is characterized for a two-layer network.
Let dθ(x) = W(θ)x + b(θ) be the decision function for
the activation pattern θ. Then for a given input u with a
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predicted class k, we can write the certificate in terms of
the minimum distance to all possible decision boundaries
as in (1). Due to the dependence on θ in denominator and
the combinatorial constraint θ(1) ∈ {0, 1}N1 , optimization
(1) is difficult to solve in general. To further simplify this
optimization, we first show that:
‖W(θ)j −W(θ)k ‖2 = ‖(W(2)j −W(2)k )diag(θ(1))W(1)‖2
≤ ‖(W(2)j −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
W relax θ(1) ∈ {0, 1}N1 to θ(1) ∈ [0, 1]N1 and solve:
min
j 6=k
min
θ(1)∈[0,1]N1
| (W(θ)j −W(θ)k )u+ b(θ)j − b(θ)k |
‖(W(2)j −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
Finally, we prove that for a two-layer network W(θ)j and
b
(θ)
j are linear in θ and hence the above optimization can be
solved efficiently. We summarize our result in the following
theorem:
Theorem 4. Given a test input u for a 2 layer neural net-
work with predicted class k, let dθ(x) =W(θ)x+ b(θ) be
the decision function for the activation pattern θ where:
W(θ) =W(2)diag(θ(1))W(1)
b(θ) =W(2)diag(θ(1))b1 + b(2)
Let u0 be the closest adversarial example. We have that:
‖u− u0‖2
≥ min
j 6=k
min
θ(1)∈[0,1]N1
| (W(θ)j −W(θ)k )u+ (b(θ)j − b(θ)k ) |
‖W(2)j −W(2)k ‖2‖W(1)‖2
(a) RHS defines a provable lower bound to the closest adver-
sarial example (b) ∀ i ∈ {1, ..,K}, W(θ)i , b(θ)i are linear
in θ(1) and RHS can be solved using convex optimization.
For deeper networks, the numerator of the decision bound-
ary certificate will be polynomial in θ making the optimiza-
tion difficult to solve. Developing efficient computational
approaches for this bound for deeper networks are among
interesting directions for the future work. Nevertheless, in
the next section and for a two-layer network, we include a
comparison of this bound against the Simplex certificate.
5. Experiments
In this section, we numerically assess the performance of
our proposed robustness certificates. We also compare our
proposed lower bounds with some existing upper bounds
including the Iterative FGSM (Kurakin et al., 2016a) and
DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016).
Note that DeepFool and Iterative FGSM provide upper
bounds on the distance of a point to its closest adversar-
ial example. Nevertheless, we compare our proposed lower
bounds with these upper bounds (1) to provide a partial
empirical validation of the correctness of our lower bounds,
and (2) to assess the gap between the proposed lower bounds
and existing upper bounds.
First, we compare the two proposed certificates, namely the
simplex certificate (Section 4.1) and the decision boundary
certificate (Section 4.2) and DeepFool and Iterative FGSM
upper bounds over a two-layer ReLU network with 1024
hidden units for an MNIST-binary classification task. The
network was to classify a digit as either being ≥ 5 or < 5.
Figure 2a demonstrates our numerical results in this case.
We observe that in all examples, the simplex certificate
significantly outperforms the decision boundary one (note
that a good certificate obtains large values of the lower
bound). However, it may be possible that an extension of the
decision boundary certificate to deeper networks performs
better than the simplex certificate in some examples. We
leave exploring this direction for the future work.
Moreover, from Figure 2a, as expected, we observe that
the values of simplex and decision boundary certificates are
smaller than the values computed by Iterative FGSM and
DeepFool upper bounds. We also observe that DeepFool
provides a better upper bound compared to Iterative FGSM.
In our next experiment, we consider a deeper network than
the previous case. In this case we only evaluate the perfor-
mance of the simplex certificate since the decision boundary
certificate is valid for two-layer networks. More specifi-
cally, we consider a three-layer MLP with ReLU activations
on the MNIST dataset for digit classification. The number
of hidden units were 1024 and 512 at the first and second
hidden layers, respectively.
Figure 2b shows comparison between our simplex lower
bound and DeepFool and Iterative FGSM upper bounds. We
validate that our simplex certificate values are smaller than
both upper bound values. Similar to the two-layer case, we
observe that DeepFool provides a better upper bound than
that of Iterative FGSM. In some examples, the differences
between the DeepFool upper bound values and our simplex
lower bound values are small, indicating the tightness of our
simplex bounds in those cases.
One key advantage of the proposed simplex certificate is
its efficient computation even for deep networks. This can
allow using a simplex regularization in training robust clas-
sifiers. Table 1 shows a comparison of running times of
our proposed simplex certificate and some other existing
lower bounds including the Fast Lin, Fast-Lip proposed in
(Weng et al., 2018a) and CROWN-Ada proposed in (Zhang
et al., 2018). As shown in this table, our simplex certificate
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Figure 2. (a) Comparison between simplex and decision boundary lower bounds and Iterative FGSM and DeepFool upper bounds for
two-layer ReLU networks. (b) Comparison between the Simplex lower bound, and Iterative FGSM and DeepFool upper bounds for
three-layer ReLU networks. Note that Decision Boundary certificate cannot be used in this case.
Table 1. Running time comparison between our proposed simplex certificates and other methods. m× [n] denotes a neural network with
m hidden layers each with n units. Running times are in seconds.
Config Fast-Lin Fast-Lip CROWN-Ada Simplex
MNIST 3×[1024] 0.732 1.060 1.260 0.0037
MNIST 4×[1024] 1.790 2.580 3.520 0.0063
CIFAR 7×[1024] 12.70 20.90 20.70 0.0387
is an order of magnitude more efficient to compute com-
pared to these approaches. We note that running times for
other approaches reported in Table 1 are taken directly from
respective references and thus can be subject to variations
due to implementation differences. A comprehensive study
of different aspects of these lower bounds is an interesting
direction for future work.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we characterized two robustness certificates
for ReLU networks, namely the simplex certificate and the
decision boundary certificate. Both of these certificates
exploit the piecewise linear structure of ReLU network,
i.e. for a given input, the decision boundary is linear in a
polyhedron around that point. In particular, our simplex
certificate is differentiable and is very efficient to compute
even for deep networks.
A regularization based on the simplex certificate can be used
for training neural networks to make them robust against ad-
versarial examples. This can be an interesting direction for
the future work. Another future work direction is to make
the robustness lower bounds closer to the true values by
exploiting piecewise linear structures of ReLU networks in
neighboring polyhedra for a given point. Finally, extensions
of our results to convolutional neural networks (CNNs) with
ReLU activations can be another promising direction for the
future work.
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A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
(a) The activation pattern for x is θ if and only if:
∀ i ∈ [N1],
{
W
(1)
i x+ b
(1)
i ≥ 0 if θ(1)i = 1
W
(1)
i x+ b
(1)
i < 0 if θ
(1)
i = 0
Thus, S(θ) gives the activation region for θ.
(b) ∀ x ∈ S(θ),
a(1)(x) = max(z(1)(x), 0) = θ(1)  z(1)(x)
Since z(1)(x) =W(1)x+ b(1),
a(1)(x) = θ(1)  (W(1)x+ b(1))
a(1)(x) = diag(θ(1))(W(1)x+ b(1))
a(2)(x) = z(2)(x) =W(2)a(1)(x) + b(2)
a(2)(x) =W(2)(diag(θ(1))(W(1)x+ b(1))) + b(2)
a(2)(x) =W(2)diag(θ(1))W(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Weight term
x
+W(2)diag(θ(1))b(1) + b(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bias term
a(2)(x) =W(θ)x+ b(θ) where ,
W(θ) =W(2)diag(θ(1))W(1) and ,
b(θ) =W(2)diag(θ(1))b(1) + b(2)
Thus, dθ(x) = W(θ)x + b(θ) is the decision function for
θ. Since W(θ) and b(θ) are constant for a given θ, a(2) is
linear in x with weights W(θ) and bias b(θ).
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
(a) We first prove S(M−1)(θ) ∩ T (φ) ⊆ S(θ). Consider
x ∈ S(M−1)(θ) ∩ T (φ). Thus, x ∈ T (φ),
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=⇒ z(M−1)(x) = g(x) =W(φ)x+ b(φ)
aM−1(x) = max(z(M−1)(x), 0)
aM−1(x) = max(W(φ)x+ b(φ), 0)
Since x ∈ S(M−1)(θ), the indicator vector of (M − 1)th
layer is θ(M−1). Thus,
=⇒ x ∈ S(θ)
=⇒ S(M−1)(θ) ∩ T (φ) ⊆ S(θ)
Now we prove S(θ) ⊆ S(M−1)(θ) ∩ T (φ),
Consider x ∈ S(θ),
Since x induces θ in f(.), it must induce φ in g(.)
Hence x ∈ T (φ),
=⇒ z(M−1)(x) = g(x) =W(φ)x+ b(φ)
But since x ∈ S(θ),
The indicator vector of (M − 1)th layer must be θ(M−1).
(M − 1)th indicator can be θ(M−1) iff x ∈ S(M−1)(θ)
=⇒ x ∈ S(M−1)(θ) and x ∈ T (φ)
Thus, S(θ) ⊆ S(M−1)(θ) ∩ T (φ)
=⇒ S(θ) = S(M−1)(θ) ∩ T (φ)
(b) ∀ x ∈ S(θ),
a(M−1)(x) = max(z(M−1)(x), 0)
a(M−1)(x) = θ(M−1)  z(M−1)(x)
Since z(M−1)(x) =W(φ)x+ b(φ),
a(M−1)(x) = θ(M−1)  (W(φ)x+ b(φ))
a(M−1)(x) = diag(θ(M−1))(W(φ)x+ b(φ))
a(M)(x) = z(M)(x) =W(M)a(M−1)(x) + b(M)
a(M)(x) =W(M)(diag(θ(M−1))(W(φ)x+ b(φ))) + b(M)
a(M)(x) =W(M)diag(θ(M−1))W(φ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Weight term
x
+W(M)diag(θ(M−1))b(φ) + b(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bias term
a(M)(x) =W(θ)x+ b(θ) where,
W(θ) =W(M)diag(θ(M−1))W(φ),
b(θ) =W(M)diag(θ(M−1))b(φ) + b(M)
Hence, W(θ) and b(θ) are constant for a given θ and a(M)
is linear in x with weights W(θ) and bias b(θ).
A.3. Proof of Corollary 1
Using Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the ith hidden layer adds
Ni inequalities to the activation region and the decision
function is constant given θ. The proof follows using induc-
tion.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3
Pmin is the minimum of the distances of the input from
all the faces of the Polyhedron S(θ). dmin denotes the
minimum of the distances of the input from all the decision
boundaries defined by the decision function dθ.
Consider two cases:
Case 1: u0 lies inside the polyhedron S(θ)
Since u0 lies inside the polyhedron,
f(u0) =W
(θ)u0 + b
(θ)
Since u0 is the closest adversarial example,
fj(u0) = fk(u0) (for some j 6= k)
and it must lie on the decision boundary:
W
(θ)
j u0 + b
(θ)
j =W
(θ)
k u0 + b
(θ)
k (where j 6= k)
Since dmin is the minimum distance of u from all such
decision boundaries.
=⇒ ‖u− u0‖2 ≥ dmin (3)
Case 2: u0 lies outside the polyhedron S(θ)
Since u0 lies outside the polyhedron, minimum distance of
u from all the faces of the polyhedron S(θ) gives a lower
bound to the distance from u0. Since eachP
(θ)
i x+q
(θ)
i = 0,
defines a face of the polyhedra,
=⇒ ‖u− u0‖2 ≥ Pmin (4)
Using 3 and 4,
‖u− u0‖2 ≥ min(dmin, Pmin)
A.5. Proof of Theorem 4
Let u0 is the closest adversarial example, and φ be the
activation pattern for u0. Since u0 must lie on a decision
boundary, we assume for some l:
c(φ)u0 + d
(φ) = 0 where,
c(φ) =W
(φ)
l −W(φ)k
d(φ) = b
(φ)
l − b(φ)k
‖u− u0‖2 ≥ | c
(φ)u+ d(φ) |
‖cφ‖2
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Simplifying the denominator term ‖c(φ)‖2,
‖c(φ)‖2
= ‖(W(2)l −W(2)k )diag(φ(1))W(1)‖2
≤ ‖(W(2)l −W(2)k )‖2‖diag(φ(1))W(1)‖2
≤ ‖(W(2)l −W(2)k )‖2‖diag(φ(1))‖2‖W(1)‖2
Since ‖diag(φ(1))‖2 = max(φ(1)) ≤ 1
=⇒ ‖c(φ)‖2 ≤ ‖(W(2)l −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
1
‖c(φ)‖2 ≥
1
‖(W(2)l −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
Since ‖u− u0‖2 ≥ | c
(φ)u+ d(φ) |
‖cφ‖2
Substituting
1
‖c(φ)‖2 ,
‖u− u0‖2
≥ | c
(φ)u+ d(φ) |
‖(W(2)l −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
=
| (W(φ)l −W(φ)k )u+ b(φ)l − b(φ)k |
‖(W(2)l −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
≥ min
j 6=k
| (W(φ)j −W(φ)k )u+ b(φ)j − b(φ)k |
‖(W(2)j −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
≥ min
j 6=k
min
θ
(1)
i ∈{0,1}
| (W(θ)j −W(θ)k )u+ b(θ)j − b(θ)k |
‖(W(2)j −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
≥ min
j 6=k
min
0≤θ(1)i ≤1
| (W(θ)j −W(θ)k )u+ b(θ)j − b(θ)k |
‖(W(2)j −W(2)k )‖2‖W(1)‖2
Since W(θ)j and W
(θ)
k are row vectors, we can simplify,
W
(θ)
j =W
(2)
j diag(θ
(1))W(1)
= (θ1)Tdiag(W
(2)
j )W
(1),
b
(θ)
j =W
(2)
j diag(θ
(1))b(1) + b
(2)
j
= (θ(1))Tdiag(W
(2)
j )b
(1) + b
(2)
j
Similarly for W(θ)k and b
(θ)
k .
Since W(θ)j , b
(θ)
j and W
(θ)
k , b
(θ)
k are linear in θ, RHS can
be solved using convex optimization.
B. Details of Experiments
B.1. Details of Experiments reported in Figure 2a
Hyper-parameters used in this experiment are reported in
Table 2.
Table 2. Hyper-parameters used in experiments of Figure 2a
Parameter Config
Optimizer Adam
Network architecture [784, 1024, 2]
Batch size 64
Number of epochs 20
Learning rate 0.001
Initialization Glorot
B.2. Details of Experiments reported in Figure 2b
Hyper-parameters used in this experiment are reported in
Table 3.
Table 3. Hyper-parameter used in experiments of Figure 2b
Parameter Config
Optimizer Adam
Network architecture [784, 1024, 512, 10]
Batch size 64
Number of epochs 20
Learning rate 0.001
Initialization Glorot
B.3. Details of Experiments reported in Table 1 in the
Main text
Hyper-parameters used in this experiment are reported in
Table 4.
Table 4. Hyper-parameter used in experiments of Table 1 in the
main text
Parameter Config
Optimizer Adam
Batch size 64
Number of epochs 20
Learning rate 0.001
Initialization Glorot
